As I followed the expanding war with Iran, I found myself thinking not about Washington—but about Mao Zedong.
That may sound strange. But the pattern unfolding in the Middle East bears a striking resemblance to Mao's theory of protracted warfare—a strategy built not on quick victory, but on pressure, disruption, and time. The question is whether that is intentional—or whether Washington is drifting into it without a map and without an exit.
Mao developed his theory during China's war against Japan in the 1930s. He rejected the idea of a decisive, early knockout. Instead, he argued that a weaker force could defeat a stronger enemy through sustained struggle—wearing it down politically, economically, and psychologically until conditions finally tipped in its favor. His essential logic: avoid decisive confrontation early, stretch the conflict, and exhaust the opponent. Mao believed chaos—properly managed—could become a weapon.
Now look at what we are seeing in Iran.
The United States and Israel have struck thousands of targets, degraded Iran's military, and established air dominance. By any traditional battlefield measure, that is success. But instead of a clear endgame, the war keeps evolving—and not on Washington's terms.
The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since February 28, strangling global energy markets. Brent crude has climbed past $114 a barrel. The International Energy Agency has declared the current energy crisis worse than the consecutive oil shocks of 1973 and 1979—a "major, major threat" to the global economy. Nearly 5,000 U.S. Marines are converging on the Gulf, with policymakers debating whether to seize Kharg Island, the hub handling ninety percent of Tehran's crude revenues. Iran's nationwide internet blackout has now surpassed 552 hours—the longest and most severe ever recorded in any country.
This is no longer a limited strike campaign. It is a broader contest over economic pressure, strategic leverage, and raw endurance. It has the unmistakable shape of protracted war.
The United States is not Maoist, and President Trump is not following communist doctrine. But strategy often transcends ideology. The method visible here—apply pressure across multiple domains, disrupt the enemy's economic base, and force the adversary into increasingly costly choices—mirrors key elements of Mao's approach.
The problem is that Mao designed protracted war for the weaker side. China in the 1930s was outmatched militarily. Protracted war was a strategy born of necessity. America is not the weaker power. Which raises the question no one in Washington appears to be answering: if we adopt a strategy built for weakness, what are we actually trying to achieve?
The answer remains dangerously murky—made worse by the chaos emanating from the White House itself.
On Friday, Trump posted that the U.S. was considering "winding down" the war. Twenty-four hours later, he threatened to "hit and obliterate" Iran's power plants if Tehran did not reopen the Strait within forty-eight hours. Then—hours before that deadline expired Monday—he extended it five more days, citing "very good and productive conversations" that could yield a "complete and total resolution." Iran did not acknowledge any talks. Over barely ninety-six hours: winding down, threatening obliteration, then standing down in exchange for negotiations Tehran declined to confirm.
The downstream effects of this incoherence are cascading. The UAE downed seven ballistic missiles and sixteen drones on Monday alone—352 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles, and 1,789 drones intercepted since the war began, with eight dead and 161 wounded. Iran's parliament speaker threatened buyers of U.S. Treasury bonds directly: "Purchase them, and you purchase a strike on your HQ and assets." Tehran warned it would mine the Persian Gulf and strike electricity plants across the Middle East powering American military bases. Britain's prime minister convened an emergency economic war council with his chancellor and the Bank of England governor. Iran's strategy, as one Atlantic Council analyst noted bluntly, requires no symmetry: "They don't need to fight a symmetrical war. They just need to survive." That is Mao's calculus—adapted for the twenty-first century and applied against a superpower that has still not articulated what winning actually looks like.
Is the objective to degrade Iran's military? That is largely happening—though U.S. officials acknowledge that heavy bombardments have still not limited Tehran's capacity to shut the Strait. Is it to eliminate Iran's nuclear program? Strikes can delay it, but they cannot erase the knowledge or dispersed materials needed to rebuild. Is it regime change? Airpower alone does not topple regimes. It did not in Iraq, Kosovo, or Afghanistan.
The writer of Proverbs stated it plainly: "For lack of guidance a nation falls, but victory is won through many advisers" (Proverbs 11:14). A president issuing a forty-eight-hour ultimatum at 7:44 on a Saturday evening, then standing it down before it expired—with no confirmed diplomatic framework—is not the picture of coordinated strategic counsel. As one senior analyst put it, the administration has "no vision, no plan, no exit strategy."
The war launched on February 28 has never been put to a congressional vote. Trump has now asked Congress for $200 billion in supplemental military funding—a number that tells you, better than any press briefing, how long this administration actually expects the fighting to last.
The danger is not that we are losing militarily. The danger is that we are winning tactically while drifting strategically—sliding into a long conflict without a defined end state. We have been here before. In Iraq, early battlefield victories gave way to years of costly, uncertain outcome. Power without a clear political objective produces prolonged conflict.
Protracted war is not something a great power stumbles into and manages on instinct. Once it begins, it shapes events rather than responding to them. The longer it runs without a coherent end state, the harder it becomes for any president—or any nation—to control.
Notice: This column is printed with permission. Opinion pieces published by AFN.net are the sole responsibility of the article's author(s), or of the person(s) or organization(s) quoted therein, and do not necessarily represent those of the staff or management of, or advertisers who support the American Family News Network, AFN.net, our parent organization or its other affiliates.
